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Thank you for your attentive reading of the paper and for your further comments. We are happy that 
you appreciate our efforts to follow your guidance. We are very grateful for your suggestions and 
we have tried to implement as many as we could in this latest version of the paper. 
In what follows we explain how we revised the paper on the base of your comments, highlighting 
the major changes with respect to its previous version. We also discuss how we accounted for those 
comments that we could not investigate directly due to data availability. 
We wish to thank you very much for guiding us through this extensive revision process and 
particularly for directing our efforts towards a justifiable econometric approach to support our 
findings.  
Best regards, 
The Authors 
 
 
  
*Detailed Response to Reviewers
 1. First, in the intro, I would tone down the method approach as a contribution, though you 
might discuss that you rule out other plausible alternatives.  
We have removed the emphasis on the method approach as a contribution, focusing instead on the 
actual contribution to the risk literature. In the introduction we briefly discuss the econometric 
approach that we use in addressing the empirical question in term of model, estimation strategy and 
standard errors calculations for inference. We felt that this would help the reader to get a clear 
picture of the methodology together with the research question from the outset.  
 
2. Second, I would spend some more time on how to package the results in the best way. The 
manuscript still feels more like a rough draft than a finished product.   
We have re written the comments on our empirical findings, in the attempt to make them better 
structured and more extensive. We have highlighted how they support our original hypothesis, 
hopefully increasing the clarity of our contribution. We have also modified the Conclusions section 
following your suggestion on the need to indicate further directions for work on which others can 
build (as discuss below in more details). 
In details, in the introductory Section we have modified a paragraph as follows (for the sake of 
simplicity, the new parts are in Italics): 
“We find that IRB banks did face a lower credit risk increase in the aftermath of the great 
financial crisis. This evidence suggests that IRB banks were better able to select and manage 
credit risk and that, despite the potential heterogeneity and discretionality in the validation 
process, validated IRB models and procedures are superior. Furthermore, since to obtain 
validation and enjoy the capital savings steaming from IRB risk weights, banks undergo 
massive investments in terms of data collection, risk management tools and procedures and 
human capital, we pose that the adoption of the IRB approach by regulators has contributed 
to spur the use of stronger credit risk management practices among banks.” 
 
In Section 5 (Results) we have widened the general comments of our results and we have put more 
emphasis on our findings concerning the IRB dummy variable and the inverse Mills ratio.  
In particular, we have highlighted the following aspects: 
“The superiority of IRB banks in managing risk, supported by our outcome equation 
findings,  is a consequence of their increased risk management capabilities, as  the Mills 
ratio significance and sign suggest. Such improvements in turn arise from the effort in terms 
of data, tools, procedures and human capital that banks must make in order to obtain IRB 
validation.” 
 “The increasing number of  IRB banks  coupled with the evidence on the effectiveness  of 
IRB models in managing credit risk suggest that the introduction of the IRB approach by 
regulators has enhanced the diffusion of sound and robust credit risk management 
procedures and tools among banks. Thus, our findings contribute to the existing literature on 
risk-sensitive regulation by showing that there is a ‘bright’ side of the internal rating-based 
approach..” 
 
3. Third, I would put some thought into the mechanism(s) behind why the IRB approach is 
helpful. Are the models superior or does the firm actually learn more about or focus more 
on risk management under the IRB regime? I wonder if you can use your data, even 
descriptively, to shed some light on this issue. For example, do you see any evidence that 
firms get better at managing risk the longer they use the IRB approach? Some discussion on 
this issue could be useful at the end of the paper and could be useful for others building on 
this work. 
 
This is a very interesting question and, as you suggest, a very relevant direction for future work. 
The light we can shed on this point is based on our results  on the significance of the Mills ratio in 
the continuous outcome equation. We have tried to express this with more clarity in Section 5.1 
where, upon commenting the significance of the Mills ratio we write 
“This endogeneity is due to latent factors that impact both on the IRB propensity of adoption 
and on the NPL ratio. We conjecture that these factors are related to the quality of the risk 
management of a bank which affects both the outcome of the validation process and its 
screening and monitoring abilities which eventually impact on the level of credit risk.”  
Moreover, we have rephrased some parts of our work and added new elements to clearly convey 
our hypothesis and our contribution, i.e. The use of IRB models for regulatory purposes allows for 
capital savings and represent an incentive for banks to improve their risk management skills in 
order to achieve IRB models validation. We assess the superiority of validated models in 
controlling credit risk, thus supporting the view that a more risk-sensitive regulation (i.e. the IRB 
approach introduced by Basel II) has spurred the use of more accurate and effective risk 
management tools and procedures among banks.  
However our data set does not allow us to shed any light on whether there is an improvement over 
time at managing risk the longer a bank is in the IRB regime. If we had a longer time span of 
available data we could consider two subsample of IRB banks and test if there is a significant 
difference in the Mills ratios.  
As you recommend we include a discussion on this issue in the Conclusion, suggesting which type 
of data could help in addressing it:  
“An interesting issue that we do not address is whether the overall bank risk management 
effectiveness improves after the validation of its internal rating models. As a matter of fact, 
the authorization to use IRB models for regulatory purposes may concern only a share of the 
loan portfolio, e.g. portfolios including only retail or corporate exposures or mortgages, 
etc.. As the bank risk management tools and procedures become more accurate, supervisors 
may allow the bank to shift from SA to IRB other shares of the loan portfolio and may also 
allow for a shift from Foundation IRB (F-IRB) to Advanced IRB (A-IRB). Further research 
may shed light on this issue by accounting more specifically for the adoption of F-IRB vs A-
IRB over time and for the shares of loan portfolios under either of these models.” 
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1. Introduction  
Risk-sensitive capital ratios are the cornerstone of bank prudential regulatory framework. Banks 
are required to hold regulatory capital as a percentage of their total risk-weighted assets (RWAs). 
Since the enforcement of Basel II, banks calculate their minimum capital requirements under Pillar 
I using either risk weights provided by regulators (the standardised approach (SA)) or risk weights 
based on their internal risk models (the internal ratings based approach (IRB)). In the regulators’ 
intentions,  the introduction of IRB models  was aimed at i) improving the risk-sensitivity and the 
soundness of minimum capital charges, ii) promoting the adoption of stronger risk management 
practices by banks,  iii) aligning managerial and supervisory perspective, thus reducing the scope 
for potential arbitrage (BCBS, 2000 and 2006).  To promote IRB adoption, the new framework 
ensures that capital requirements are lower under the IRB  than  the SA approach (BCBS, 2006). 
The aftermath of the publication of Basel II has witnessed a growing debate on the reliability of 
IRB models and on the desirability of such a sophisticated model-based regulation. (Haldane, 
2011). Despite a general agreement on its validity, quite a few aspects of the new regulatory 
framework have been questioned so far (BCBS, 2013; EBA, 2013). A number of authors  suggests 
that validated IRB models may bring negative implications, such as : i) opacity in credit risk 
measurement and lack of comparability of RWAs across banks; ii) incentives and opportunities for 
risk weights manipulation and regulatory arbitrage; and iii) a bias in asset allocation and a pro-
cyclical effect on banks lending policy (Arroyo et al., 2012; Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2014; 
Bruno et al., 2015; Ferri and Pesic, 2016; Beltratti and Palladino, 2016; Behn et al., 2016a; Pèrez 
Montes et al., 2016; Berg and Koziol, 2017). While the negative implications of the IRB framework 
have been thoroughly discussed in the literature, few studies have indirectly investigated whether 
such models accurately measure risk and contribute to the adoption of stronger risk management 
practices among banks,thus improving banks’ resilience, as meant by the regulators (Mariathasan 
and Merrouche, 2014; Mascia et al., 2016; Behn et al., 2016b; Bruno et al., 2016). 
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The use of IRB models to compute the minimum capital requirement is allowed only after 
validation by the supervisory authorities. During the validation period, which can take up to several 
years, a bank is required to implement in its internal models any change requested by the 
supervisors, to provide clear evidence of the robustness of such  models and  to demonstrate their  
relevance in the day-by-day risk management and in its own risk culture. For all these reasons, we 
expect validated IRB models to display strong accuracy and effectiveness in measuring risk as 
meant by the regulators. 
The aim of this paper is to verify if this expectation is supported by the data. We investigate 
whether banks with validated internal models (henceforth IRB banks) are more effective in 
managing credit risk, thus supporting the hypothesis that the IRB regulatory framework has 
promoted stronger risk management practises and enhanced banks resilience. 
Evaluating banks credit risk management effectiveness is a rather difficult task for an external 
analyst since it requires data which are not publicly available and it might be affected by 
discretionality.  We assess the effectiveness of risk management procedures by looking at the risk 
management output, i.e.  the level of risk borne by a bank.  We proxy credit risk by the ratio of non-
performing loans to total gross loans (the so-called NPL ratio). Our analysis focuses on the 
European banking system and employs a novel panel data set of 177 banks from 14 countries 
observed during the period following the Basel II enforcement (2008-2015). This period captures 
the immediate aftermath of the great financial crisis, which saw a prolonged negative economic 
cycle and a fast and marked increase in credit risk levels. We believe that it offers an excellent setup 
to assess whether banks with validated IRB models were able to curb the increase in credit risk 
driven by the macroeconomic slowdown better than banks under the standardized approach (SA 
banks). 
We contribute to the credit risk literature by evaluating the impact of validated IRB models on 
efficient risk management and by investigating which factors drive IRB adoption at bank level. The 
accuracy of IRB models has been discussed  by few authors indirectly (Mariathasan and Merrouche, 
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2014; Mascia et al., 2016; Behn et al., 2016b; Bruno et al., 2016) but, to our knowledge, the only 
paper assessing their direct impact on credit risk is Erdinc and Gurov’s (2016). These scholars find 
a negative and significant impact of validated IRB models on asset quality at country level. We 
improve on their findings by testing the impact of IRB on loan portfolio deterioration at bank level 
and by considering a longer time span that includes the whole economic slowdown following the 
great financial crisis.  
 We address the research question in the context of dynamic panels with endogenous dynamic 
binary treatment.  Estimation methods for dynamic panel models with sample selection are well 
established in the literature (Kyriziadou 2001; Semykina and Wooldridge 2013) for the case of a 
static and  a dynamic selection equation. Methods for dynamic panels with a dynamic, state 
dependent, endogenous binary treatment have not received much attention in the econometric 
literature so far.  We implement an empirical strategy based on a dynamic panel Probit equation and 
a dynamic panel continuous outcome equation. Estimation is conducted using System GMM 
methods with Heckman-type correction for endogeneity. To account for the distortion introduced by 
the generated regressor , we compute the main equation standard errors by bootstrap. 
We find that IRB banks did face a lower credit risk increase in the aftermath of the great financial 
crisis. This evidence suggests that IRB banks were better able to select and manage credit risk and 
that, despite the potential heterogeneity and discretionality in the validation process, validated IRB 
models and procedures are superior. Furthermore, since to obtain validation and enjoy the capital 
savings steaming from IRB risk weights, banks undergo massive investments in terms of data 
collection, risk management tools and procedures and human capital, we pose that the adoption of 
the IRB approach by regulators has contributed to spur the use of stronger credit risk management 
practices among banks.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the main features of the 
IRB validation process and surveys the relevant literature; Section 3 describes our data; Section 4 
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illustrates our empirical strategy and econometric methodology. Section 5 offers some discussion of 
our empirical findings and robustness checks and, finally, Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. The regulatory use of the IRB approach and literature review 
2.1 The introduction of IRB models in the European banking system 
The IRB approach was introduced in 2004 by the Second Accord of the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision (Basel II) as an alternative to the standardized approach (SA). In Europe the 
use of IRB approach for regulatory purposes was allowed since June 2006 by the Capital 
Requirements Directive; its adoption by banks started to spread from 2008 onwards.  
While according to the SA approach banks must use risk weights provided by the regulators, 
under the IRB approach they use their own internal rating models to estimate the different 
components of the expected loss. Under Foundation IRB, banks determine internally the probability 
of default (PD) only, under Advanced IRB, they define internally the loss given default (LGD), the 
exposure at default (EAD) and the maturity (M) as well. As a consequence, IRB banks may benefit 
from a more granular credit risk measurement that brings lower risk weights and ultimately implies 
lower capital charges.  
The use of IRB models is conditional on supervisory authorities’ validation. In Europe, 
validation of the models used to be granted by national supervisors since the end of 2014, when the 
Single Supervisory Mechanism established that IRB models of ‘significant’ banks must be 
validated by the European Central Bank. 
To validate the models, supervisors rely on quite stringent criteria and guidelines covering 
several aspects of the bank rating system, ranging from statistical methodologies to ‘processes, 
controls, data collection and IT systems that support the assessment of credit risk, the assignment of 
internal risk ratings, and the quantification of default and loss estimates’ , assessed on an ongoing 
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base (BCBS, 2006). In the overall, IRB validation is a long process which requires a massive effort 
and a significant modification of a bank’s risk management practises and models.  
Since its adoption is not mandatory in the European banking system, only banks that anticipate 
substantial net benefits from the IRB approach are likely to apply for it. More specifically, banks 
decide to enter a validation process on the base of a cost-benefit analysis. Compliance costs 
associated with validation are mostly fixed costs of significant magnitude  making the IRB adoption 
more convenient for large rather than small banks. Moreover, in order to be approved, internal 
models must pass a ‘data quality check’ and a ‘replication exercise’ (Arroyo et al., 2012) which 
require wide and accurate databases, that may not be available for small banks. The most significant 
advantage in the use of internal models is the lower risk weights arising from a more granular credit 
risk measurement, that in turn allow for savings in capital requirements. The relation between PD 
and risk weights is concave: very steep for low PD values and flatter for high PD values (Behn et 
al., 2016a). Thus, the highest benefits in terms of risk weight reduction are associated with low-PD 
exposures, although also large and highly risky exposures, which tend to absorb large amount of 
capital, may generate sizable savings. These benefits represent an incentive for banks, especially for 
the less capitalised or fast-growing ones, to apply for validation of their IRB models.  
Once internal models are validated, exit from the IRB framework must be approved by the 
supervisors and, as stated in Basel II (2006), “A voluntary return to the standardised or foundation 
approach is permitted only in extraordinary circumstances”. 
Data on the use of validated IRB models are rather scant and display significant heterogeneity 
across countries.  According to national supervisory authorities’ data1, at the end of 2013, 46% of 
the overall capital that European banks were required to hold was generated using the IRB 
approaches (Resti, 2016). In some countries like Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal, internal 
                                                 
1
 Data refer to a sample of 105 banks from 21 European countries and account for around 70% of total European 
banking assets. 
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models accounted for less than 33% of the total capital requirements, in Denmark, the Netherlands 
and Sweden they exceeded 70%.   
Using data from the EBA transparency exercise (June 2015) on credit risk only (which accounts 
for 85% of total RWAs), Turk-Ariss (2017) finds a high dispersion of IRB adoption across 
European banks. While more than 90% of banks in Northern European countries use the IRB 
approach, the large majority of banks in few countries such as Cyprus, Latvia and Poland adopts the 
SA framework. 
 
2.2 The IRB approach in the literature 
Since its introduction, scholars and authorities have given rise to an intense debate on the 
effectiveness and reliability of the IRB approach. In particular this regulatory framework has been 
questioned for its high complexity and the strong degree of discretionality allowed to banks. The 
sophistication of internal risk models makes risk estimates and RWAs comparison difficult across 
different banks, unless a host of detailed information, often not publicly available, is taken into 
account (Haldane, 2010; Arroyo et al., 2012; Ledo, 2011; Cannata et al. 2012). Empirical studies 
suggest that such degree of discretionality, coupled with the opportunity for capital savings, 
generate incentives for regulatory arbitrage and capital requirements manipulation especially for 
capital constrained banks (Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2014; Plosser and Santos, 2014; Pèrez 
Montes et al.2016; Ferri and Pesic, 2016; Berg and Koziol, 2017)
2
.  
It has been argued  that, heterogeneous risk weights and discrepancies in RWAs may also stem 
from differences in the validation process itself (Le Leslè and Avramova, 2012; Arroyo et al., 2012; 
Ledo, 2011; EBA, 2013; EBA, 2016, Bruno et al., 2016; BCBS, 2016 and 2016b) and/or from a 
different ‘supervisory pressure’  (Arroyo et al., 2012; Mariathasan and Merrouche, 2014).  These 
                                                 
2
 These potential flaws have been addressed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision that in 2010  has 
issued a revised regulatory framework (also known as Basel III) and at the end of 2017 has finalized another set of 
reforms that aim at improving the comparability of capital ratios across banks and limiting the strategic use of internal 
risk models. 
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differences may be exacerbated by the use of different models to measure different component of 
the overall credit risk. The flexibility allowed by regulators, justified by the willingness to align 
regulation to banks risk management practices, is itself an implicit source of model risk, i.e. 
different risk models may generate different results given the same underlying risk
3
.  
The banking authorities (BCBS, 2016; EBA, 2016; ECB Banking Supervision, 2017) have 
already addressed these criticisms and in the overall there is a general consensus on the validity of 
the IRB framework as a risk-sensitive way to measure capital requirements (Barakova and Palvia, 
2014; Colliard, 2015; Resti, 2016; Huizinga, 2016).  
The alleged manipulation of risk weights represents a potential flaw in risk reporting, which is a 
different issue with respect to the effectiveness and accuracy of validate internal models. A bank 
may have a sophisticated and accurate internal risk model and choose to underreport its own risk.  
As previously discussed, the ability of IRB models to measure risk and discriminate among 
borrowers and the effectiveness and robustness of IRB banks risk management practices have been 
investigated only indirectly in the literature. Behn et al. (2016b) analyse a sample of German banks 
and find that single loans and loan portfolios under the IRB approach have lower PD and RWA but 
higher actual default rate and loan loss rate. While this result supports the hypothesis of 
underreporting, the authors find also that, despite the low PD, the interest rates associated with these 
portfolios and loans are higher, suggesting that validated internal models have high discriminatory 
power and do allow for an accurate risk measurement. Mariathasan and Merrouche (2014) use 
bank-level data show that weakly capitalized banks report RWAs values not consistent with their 
riskiness and find evidence that under-reporting is due to a strategic manipulation of risk weights 
rather than to the use of flawed internal models. Finally, a number of studies show that during the 
negative economic cycle in the aftermath of the great financial crisis, European IRB banks 
reallocated credit from riskier to safer borrowers (Mascia et al., 2016; Behn et al., 2016a, 2016b; 
                                                 
3
 These differences tend to amplify i) in time of crisis, when markets are more volatile, and ii) for credit risk 
models, due to the scarcity of  public data about borrowers (Danielsson, 2002; Danielsson et al. 2015) 
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Bruno et al., 2016), which supports the hypothesis that IRB banks managed to select their 
borrowers accurately and curb the undesired increase in credit risk. 
The aim of this paper is to contribute to the debate on the effectiveness of the current prudential 
regulatory framework by investigating the regulatory use of the IRB approach. Considering that i) 
the introduction of the IRB approach is aimed at promoting the adoption of stronger risk 
management practices; ii) the validation occurs once banks have modified their models according to 
the prescription of supervisors and have proven their accuracy and robustness; and iii) the validation 
process may be affected by discretionality, we assess if IRB models are more accurate in managing 
credit risk than non-validated models used by SA banks. To this end, we investigate if, during the 
recession period that followed the great financial crisis, IRB banks managed to curb the 
deterioration of their loan portfolio better than SA banks. 
 
3. Data and descriptive statistics 
3.1 The sample and variables 
Our empirical analysis is based on a balanced panel of 177 banks from 14 Western European 
countries
4
, accounting for about 63% of the banking system total assets of these countries. We focus 
on the parent banks of banking groups at the country level
5
, since credit risk and the ensuing capital 
policies are usually envisaged and managed mainly at the group level. The initial sample consisted 
of 341 banks and was selected according to the availability of information on the bank’s regulatory 
approach (the standardized (SA) or the validated IRB approach) obtained from the SNL Unlimited 
data-base. We restrict our analysis to commercial banks, cooperative banks, savings banks, real 
estate banks and bank holdings, to focus on banks types most exposed to credit risk. In line with De 
Haas and Van Lelyveld (2014), we drop from the sample banks with total assets of less than 10 
                                                 
4
Austria, Belgium, German, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, UK, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and 
Sweden.  
5
 For banking groups that operate in more than one country, we identified the parent company at the country level – i.e. 
the company that is at the highest level among those of each specific country - and used its the consolidated financial 
statements. Thus, we can control for the macroeconomic context at the country level.  
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billion euro in 2015
6
 and banks with an annual growth of total earning assets greater than 75%, to 
control for the effects of mergers and acquisitions. Our data set is built using different sources: 
macroeconomic data are collected from the IMF, the World Bank and the Eurostat databases, and 
bank-specific data are drawn from Bankscope, we use consolidated financial statement data at the 
country level and we use unconsolidated data for independent banks (no shareholder recorded with 
more than 50% of direct ownership).  
 Our panel consists of yearly observations over the period 2008-2015
7
, accounting for the whole 
economic slowdown which occurred in most European countries in the aftermath of the 
international financial crisis.  
We proxy credit risk by the ratio of gross non-performing loans (NPLs) to gross loans 
(NPL_GL), which is a common measure of the level of credit risk in bank loan portfolios. This 
accounting variable has been widely used in other relevant studies as an ex-post measure of the 
credit risk accumulated by a bank (Salas and Saurina, 2002; Jimenez and Saurina, 2006; Hess et al., 
2009; Boudriga et al., 2009; Louzis et al., 2011; Beck et al., 2015; Gosh, 2015)
8
. In order to 
distinguish between IRB banks and SA banks, we use a dummy variable (IRB) that equals 1 if the 
bank uses the IRB approach to calculate the regulatory minimum capital requirement
9
.   
The wide literature on credit risk and NPLs suggests that the deterioration of bank loan portfolios 
is determined by macroeconomic and bank-specific variables. It is well established that NPLs 
                                                 
6
   Smaller banks, i.e. banks with total assets under 10 billion euro, were dropped from the sample because financial data 
were in most case incomplete. However, since our analysis is performed at the group-level, using consolidated financial 
statements, smaller banks that are part of a group are indirectly represented in our sample. . 
7
 We restricted our analysis to the period starting from 2008 because, even if Basel II was enacted in 2004, only from 
2008 most of European supervisory authorities had started to validate the IRB models. 
8
 We are aware that NPLs may be affected by differences in the accounting policies adopted across Europe. Only in 
2013 did the EBA publish a common definition of non-performing loans; before this date, European countries used 
different classifications of problem loans. Despite potential inhomogeneity, it is deemed the best proxy of credit risk 
that is publicly available. 
9
 As for the method used to calculate the regulatory minimum capital requirement, the SNL Unlimited data base reports 
one of the following items of information for each bank and each year: ‘Standardized’, when the bank/banking group 
adopts the standardized approach for the whole loan portfolio; ‘Foundation IRB’ and ‘Advanced IRB’ when the 
respective approach is used for the whole bank loan portfolio; ‘Mixed’ when,  referring to different segments of the loan 
portfolio, either the standardized and the IRB approach are contemporarily used, or Foundation IRB and Advanced IRB 
are contemporarily used. Our dummy is equal to 1 when the bank adopts a ‘Mixed’ or a pure IRB approach and zero 
when it uses the ‘Standardized’ approach. 
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increase during a negative economic cycle (Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 
2005; Marcucci and Quagliariello, 2009; Bofondi and Ropele, 2011; Glen and Mondragon-Velèz, 
2011; Farhan et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2015). We control for the growth rate of real GDP (GDP), the 
unemployment rate (UN) and the level of house prices and the interest rate (HPI).   
As for the bank-specific variables, a number of studies highlight that credit risk and NPLs are 
driven by three different factors: i) the quality of management; ii) the bank capitalization, and iii) 
the stance of the bank lending policy (Salas and Saurina, 2002; Boudriga et al., 2009; Louzis et al., 
2011, Glen and Mondragon-Velez, 2011; Makri et al., 2014; Chaibi and Ftiti, 2015; Ghosh, 2015; 
Zhang et al., 2016; Dimitrios et al., 2016; Chaibi, 2016).  In line with the literature, we proxy the 
quality of management by the Return on Equity (ROE) and cost to income ratio (C_I).  According 
to the so called “bad management hypothesis” (Berger and De Young, 1997; Podpiera and Weill, 
2008; Louzis et al., 2011; Klein, 2013 and Chaibi, 2016) low profitability and efficiency are due to 
poor management quality, which implies a scant ability in screening and monitoring loans, which to 
a large extent eventually become NPLs. On the other hand, the “skimping hypothesis” (Berger and 
De Young, 1997) suggests that a high cost efficiency hides the deployment of scarce resources to 
manage risks, deteriorating loan quality. 
We control   for the level of bank capitalization using the banks’ leverage ratio (E_TA, i.e. 
Equity on total assets). Thus, we account for the hypothesis that banks may have different incentive 
to take more/less risk depending on their capitalization.  Several studies, mostly focusing on the 
period pre-Basel II, find evidences of a negative and significant relationship between banks 
capitalization and their level of NPLs (Keeton and Morris, 1987; Berger and DeYoung, 1997; 
Jimenez and Saurina, 2006; Klein, 2013; Makri et al., 2014, and Chaibi, 2016). However, since the 
current prudential regulation tries to curb moral hazard incentives by imposing risk-sensitive capital 
requirement, we would expect that only well capitalized banks might afford a higher risk appetite 
and profile.  These banks need higher returns to compensate their shareholders for the higher 
riskiness of their investment, which implies a positive and significant relationship between the 
12 
 
banks’ capitalization and their NPLs, as found by Macit (2012) and Ghosh (2015). In some of the 
specifications of our baseline model, we proxy banks’ risk attitude with the Loan Premium (LP), 
defined as the difference between the bank average interest rate applied on bank loans
10
 and the 
interest rate on 10-years Government Bond of the respective country. This variable is a proxy of the 
average risk premium applied by the bank to its loans
11
. We posit that a bank that voluntarily lends 
money to riskier borrowers charges a higher risk premium, hence we expect a positive relation 
between NPL ratio and LP. 
 Finally, we proxy the bank lending policy by the rate of growth of gross loans (GLGR), 
consistently with the empirical evidence that faster loan growth leads to higher loan losses in the 
following years (up to four years) (Radlet and Sachs, 1998, Keeton, 1999, Ranjan and Dhal, 2003 
and Foos et al., 2010). To account for the apparent positive relation between loan portfolio 
deterioration and the relevance of lending activity for a bank (IMF, 2015; ECB, 2015), we use two 
well-established proxies of the bank business model:   the ratio of Gross Loans to Total Assets 
(GL_TA) and the ratio of Interest Income to Gross Revenues (II_GR).  Finally, in two 
specifications of our baseline model we include a dummy variable (DREC) that equals 1 in the 
years 2013, 2014 and 2015, i.e. the years during which the NPL ratio of European banks begins to 
decrease, after peaking in 2012, and the quality of loans portfolios starts to recover. 
Table 1 provides reports details of our variables calculations, our information sources and the 
variables expected signs.  
< Table 1 approximately here > 
 
3.2 Descriptive statistics 
                                                 
10
 Proxied by the interest income on gross loans divided by the average of gross loans at time t-1 and t. 
11
 We are aware that this proxy of risk premium is rather rough and does not take into account other variables 
that may affect the level of bank interest rate and the overall interest income, such as the cost of funding or the cost of 
equity, etc. 
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Banks in our sample are quite heterogeneous. Descriptive statistics (Table 2) show high in 
sample variability in terms of size (proxied by total assets), profitability, riskiness and regulatory 
(IRB vs. SA) approach. We observe across time an increase in the proportion of IRB vs SA banks: 
by the end of 2015 most banks in the sample adopt the IRB approach (Table 3). In line with 
previous studies (Erdinc and Gurov, 2016; Resti, 2016; Turk-Ariss, 2017), we find that the use of 
internal models varies across countries and it is slightly lower for the Southern European banking 
systems. 
< Table 2 and 3 approximately here > 
 To describe the features and the differences between SA and IRB banks, Table 4 reports 
descriptive statistics for the subsamples of respectively IRB- and SA-banks. The data are in line 
with Behn at al. (2016)
14
 and show that IRB banks have considerably larger size, higher 
profitability (ROAE) and a slightly higher efficiency (C_I). They also have a better quality of their 
credit portfolio (in term of NPL ratio and LLP ratio), suggesting the existence of a correlation 
between the use of validated IRB models and the quality of banks loan portfolio. Our hypothesis is 
that IRB adoption promotes stronger risk management practices among banks and that as 
consequences IRB banks achieve a lower level of NLPs ceteris paribus. In addressing this question, 
we face a self-selection issue: banks with more sophisticated management capabilities are very 
likely to self-select into IRB.  
We first investigate the determinants of IRB adoption and assess whether the differences in size, 
profitability and efficiency found at sample level are significant at population level. We then study 
the impact of IRB adoption on the levels of banks’ NPLs, controlling for macroeconomic and bank 
specific variables and the unobserved endogeneity.  Finally, we run several checks on a number of 
contingency variable to assess the robustness of our findings
12
. 
                                                 
12
 To shed more light on this issue we have also computed descriptive statistics for six subsets of IRB and SA 
banks; these subsets include banks that show values below or above the median of the following three variables: the 
size, as proxied by total assets, the original riskiness, as measured by the NPL ratio at 2007, and the lending policy, 
proxied by the rate of growth of gross loan. We find that IRB banks, regardless of their size, original riskiness and 
14 
 
 
4. The empirical strategy 
Our empirical setting is that of a continuous outcome equation (the credit risk equation) with an 
endogenous   binary treatment (the IRB dummy). The IRB dummy is a binary treatment that takes 
value 1 once a bank’s IRB model gets validated by the supervising authority, and zero otherwise. 
The treatment dummy might be endogenous in the credit risk equation since the IRB 
adoption/validation itself might be driven by some or all the variables relevant to the risk process. 
Failure to account for this potential source of endogeneity is well known to lead to inconsistent 
estimates of the behavioral parameters of interest, as these are confounded with parameters that 
determine the probability of entry into the treatment. To control for it, we estimate the treatment 
probability from the first stage equation and then we use it as an instrument in the continuous 
outcome equation. If the treatment is endogenous we expect to find a significant coefficient of the 
treatment probability in our main equation.  
 Further sources of concern in the empirical analysis are the time persistence of the outcome 
equation dependent variable (NLPs) and the state dependence of the treatment dummy (IRB). The 
significant time persistence of NPLs is well documented in the empirical literature on credit risk 
determinants and it strongly supported by our data
13
. It is well known that when the data generating 
process is dynamic, the consistency of the static fixed effect methods breaks down because of the 
non-zero correlation between the lagged dependent variable and the differenced error term (Matyas 
and Sevestre, 2008). Thus, we model the credit risk process with a dynamic panel equation. Finally, 
since the current regulatory framework strongly discourages exit from a validated IRB framework, 
we use a dynamic Probit equation with state dependence to model the IRB validation process.  Our 
system of equations is: 
                                                                                                                                                                  
lending policy, display a lower level of credit risk (NPL ratio and LLP ratio) than their peers. Satistics are available 
upon requests. 
13
 The Arellano Bond (1991) test for serial correlation shows rejection of the null hypothesis of no time 
dependence at 10 %, 5 % and 1% significance levels. 
15 
 
                    
 
                                                     
                                                                                  (2)  
where Equation (1) is the main outcome/second stage equation and Equation (2) is the first stage/ 
treatment equation where the IRB dummy, defined through the indicator function    ), depends on a 
linear index, on an unobserved time-constant additive individual effect and on its own state 
persistence.  We seek to estimate the treatment effect   .  The vectors     and     are vectors of 
strictly exogenous explanatory variables with possibly common elements, including both time 
variant and time invariant variables, a constant term, time and country individual effects. Although 
    and     may contain common variables, the identification by exclusion restriction scheme 
requires equation (2) to contain at least one variable which is not included in the main equation and 
displays a significant time variability (Matyas and Sevestre, 2008; Semykina and Wooldridge 
2013;). In equation (1)     contains the macro and bank specific controls discussed in the previous 
Section, time and country individual effects. We set the lag orders of the dependent and 
independent variables by minimizing the Modified BIC criterion of Han, Phillips and Sul (2017).  
Consistently with the credit risk determinants literature (Bofondi and Ropele, 2011), we find that 
macro and bank specific variables should be included with a one year lag. The IRB dummy enters 
in the outcome equation at lag t-1 considering that NPLs do not arise in the same year as the loan 
has been granted. We choose the predictors to include in the treatment equation by means of a 
general to specific exercise:       might contain all the regressors of the primary equation, and other 
factors that affect the IRB selection but do not affect NPLs. The      and    are unobserved time 
invariant individual specific effects, possibly correlated with each other. The       and     are 
unobserved disturbances, and the endogenous selection implies that in general            and 
       are correlated.  
Our estimation strategy is fully parametric. In the first stage we estimate a dynamic random 
effect Probit model by quasi maximum likelihood methods, using the DBP (Dynamic Binary 
16 
 
Probit) Gretl function package with the linearized index initial condition of Heckman (1981)
14
. This 
first stage equation is relevant in itself since it sheds some lights on the determinants of the IRB 
validation process at bank level. Using the first stage results we construct the dynamic Mills ratios 
at every t: 
   
  
                  
                    
  
where     and () denote respectively the pdf and CDF of a standard normal distribution. We 
include the inverse of the dynamic Mills ratios in our outcome equation and estimate the behavioral 
parameters with the System GMM estimator. We are not concerned with the weak instrument 
problem since the AR(1) coefficient of the NPL equation is significant but not close to unity and 
our regressors display sufficient time variability.  
At this stage we address the correction of the main equation estimated standard errors. The need 
for such correction arises from the introduction of one predicted (generated) regressor, the inverse 
dynamic Mills ratio, obtained in the auxiliary equation, in the main equation. It is well known that 
two stage procedures yield consistent estimate of the second stage parameters but the second step 
standard errors and related test statistics based on two these procedures are incorrect because of the 
sampling error introduced by the predicted regressor (Wooldrige, 2002). While the correct form of 
the asymptotic covariance matrix is well known in the case of dynamic panels with sample selection 
case (Kyriazidou 1997; Semykina and Wooldrige 2013), to the best of our knowledge this is not the 
case for dynamic panels with endogenous binary treatment.  Here we follow the common practice 
of applied econometrics and obtain the corrected standard errors via bootstrap
15
. We implement a 
parametric bootstrap scheme with 5,000 replications. To simulate the probit pseudo-dataset, we 
initialize the value of IRB to zero and the predictors at their 2008 values, and generate 1000 random 
draws from a standard Normal. We estimate the propensity to adopt IRB on the pseudo dataset with 
                                                 
14
 For a complete reference on the DBP estimation package we refer the reader to Lucchetti and Pigini (2017).  
15
 The validity of bootstrapping techniques to obtain bias-corrected confidence intervals and standard errors is 
well established in econometric research (Hall, 2002). 
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the DPM algorithm. We then simulate the main equation dataset and include the generated Mills 
ratio obtained in the first bootstrap stage in the dynamic panel estimation. We reiterate this 
procedure 5000 times and obtain the bootstrapped p-values.  
 
5. Results  
5.1 Discussion of results 
Panel A of Table 4 reports the results of the dynamic selection equation with the best 
predictive likelihood
16
. Note that identification of model (1)-(2) by exclusion restrictions is ensured 
by the inclusion in the first stage equation of the variable size, proxied by natural logarithm of Total 
Assets (SIZE), and by the inclusion of the squares of the credit risk determinants that impact on IRB 
adoption. It is standard practice in the applied treatment literature to strengthen identification by 
including non-linear functions of the significant regressors. Our main instrument, SIZE, displays a 
significant time variability and does not impact on NPLs
17
, as established in the credit risk 
determinants literature. We expect this instrument to be an important determinant of validation of 
IRB models: as previously mentioned, compliance costs associated with the validation process and 
the unavailability of large loan-datasets may act as a deterrent for small banks to apply for 
validation.  
In the equation, together with the variables ensuring identification, we include all the relevant 
credit risk drivers and two specific variables that might predict IRB adoption:  RWA density 
(RWA_TA) and Total Capital Ratio (TCR), a measure of bank capitalization. These controls 
                                                 
16
 Panel A reports the dynamic equation with the best likelihood and includes IRB specific variables that do not 
impact on NPLs and those NPLs determinants which are significant for the IRB adoption. At the bottom of the Table 
we report the LogLikelihood of the models, their standard information criteria, AIC and BIC, and the Wald test for the 
joint significance of the explanatory variables. Estimation output for the general specification is not reported but 
available upon request from the authors. 
17
 In our data set the sample correlation between size and NPLs is not significant at any level. To assess size 
validity as an instrument, we estimate all the models specifications including size in the main equation and find that it is 
never statistically significant, implying that it does not impact on NPLs. The estimation results are available upon 
request.  
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account for the fact that banks that are less capitalized and riskier have stronger incentives to use 
internal models. Both are included at t-1 to avoid any potential reverse causality issue
18
. 
In the overall, all the specifications of the selection equation display strong predictive power. 
Bearing in mind that equation (1) is a reduced form highly non-linear equation that we estimate for 
the purpose of controlling for endogeneity in the outcome equation, we notice anyhow that the 
significant coefficient associated with IRB confirms the state-dependent nature of our treatment.  
As expected and in line with previous evidence (Behn et al., 2016), the size (SIZE) displays  a 
strong predictive power, confirming that large banks are more successful in obtaining validation. 
Moreover, the significant coefficients of cost to income (C_I) and  ROAE suggest that more 
efficient and profitable banks, i.e. better managed banks, are more likely to obtain validation. We 
also find that the use of IRB models is more likely for less capitalized (E_TA and TCR) and fast 
growing banks (GLGR) and banks with a business models more oriented towards credit 
intermediation (GL_TA), i.e. those banks that may enjoy greater benefits in terms of capital savings 
thank to the use of IRB based risk weights. Moreover, the negative coefficient of RWA density 
(RWA_TA)  shows that validation is more probable for less risky banks; this result may be 
explained by the greater incentives for these banks to shift from SA to IRB due to the higher 
reduction of risk weights associated with low-PD exposures. 
Panel B of Table 4 reports the System GMM estimates of the main equation for different 
specifications of our baseline model. We work with log differences of the variables and interpret the 
coefficients as percentage variations. The bootstrap corrected p-value of the Sargan and Hansen 
tests rule out the problem of instruments over proliferation, the bootstrap corrected p-value of the 
Arellano Bond (1991) test for first and second order residuals serial correlations confirm that no 
time dependence is left unaccounted for. In the overall, all models are statistically significant. 
< Table 4 Panel A and B approximately here > 
                                                 
18
 RWA density and TCR values are influenced by the use of the IRB approach.  
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The most interesting results are the negative and significant coefficients of the IRB dummy and of 
the dynamic inverse Mills ratio. The IRB dummy 1% significance supports our research hypothesis 
that, in the aftermath of the financial crisis, banks with validated IRB  risk-management procedures, 
curbed the increase in credit risk driven by the macroeconomic slowdown better than SA banks. 
The use of IRB validated models has, ceteris paribus, reduced the NPL ratio by 11%. This evidence 
suggests that validated internal rating models and procedures are more effective in selecting less 
risky counterparts and in managing credit risk when it materializes.    
The significance of the inverse Mills ratio coefficient confirms the presence of a selection type 
endogeneity in our sample. Its sign is by definition the sign of the correlation between the 
disturbances of the outcome and of the selection equations, implying that we are accounting for a 
negative potential source of endogeneity. This endogeneity is due to latent factors that impact both 
on the IRB propensity of adoption and on the NPL ratio. We conjecture that these factors are related 
to the quality of the risk management of a bank which affects both the outcome of the validation 
process and its screening and monitoring abilities which eventually impact on the level of credit 
risk. The superiority of IRB banks in managing risk, supported by our outcome equation findings,  
is a consequence of their increased risk management capabilities, as  the Mills ratio significance and 
sign suggest. Such improvements in turn arise from the effort in terms of data, tools, procedures and 
human capital that banks must make in order to obtain IRB validation. So while our results support 
the ‘bad management’ hypothesis (Berger and De Young, 1997) and confirm that the overall quality 
of bank management, proxied by bank profitability (ROAE) and efficiency (C_I), affect the level of 
NPLs, they furthermore show the relevance of risk management skills and abilities as a specific 
means to control credit risk. The increasing number of  IRB banks  coupled with the evidence on 
the effectiveness  of IRB models in managing credit risk suggest that the introduction of the IRB 
approach by regulators has enhanced the diffusion of sound and robust credit risk management 
procedures and tools among banks. Thus, our findings contribute to the existing literature on risk-
sensitive regulation by showing that there is a ‘bright’ side of the internal rating-based approach. 
20 
 
 In line with previous studies (Salas and Saurina, 2002; and Foos et al., 2010), our analysis 
suggests that the increase in credit risk is boosted by the adoption of an expansive lending policy, 
hinting at the adverse selection issues associated with a fast growth of loans. We also find evidence 
that banks with a stronger risk appetite, proxied by higher interest rates for customer loans (i.e. loan 
premia), and with a business model more oriented towards credit intermediation are more prone to 
loan portfolio deterioration.  
Finally, in line with the current literature, we find that macro variables, such as GDP, 
unemployment and, to a lesser extent, house prices, impact significantly on NPLs (Laeven and 
Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Marcucci and Quagliariello, 2009; Bofondi and 
Ropele, 2011; Glen and Mondragon-Velèz, 2011; Farhan et al., 2012; Beck et al., 2015). Business 
cycles recessionary phases decrease borrowers’ ability to repay their debts and reduce the value of 
collaterals and act as the strongest driver of bank loan portfolios deterioration.  
 
5.2. Robustness checks 
In this section we address a number of potential concerns that may hinder the validity of our 
findings.  
It is well known that the amount of NPLs reported in bank balance sheet may be affected by 
differences in the accounting policies and in the definitions of default adopted across Europe.  
Furthermore, while NPLs capture the most severe and the largest part of credit risk, they disregard 
the credit risk embodied in exposures that are not deteriorated. However, the risk associated with 
non-deteriorated exposures influences RWAs and capital ratios and may represent an incentive for a 
bank to ask for validation of internal models. Not accounting for this component of credit risk may 
bias our analysis. Therefore, as a first robustness check, we estimate our model using an alternative 
proxy of credit risk, the loan loss provision ratio (LLP_GL) i.e.  LLPs to gross loans. The advantage 
of this variable over the NPL ratio is that it captures the credit risk embodied in performing loans. 
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Its main drawback is that it reacts more quickly to the deterioration of loan portfolio and might be 
more volatile. Table 5 reports the main equation results for all  model specifications
19
. 
<Table 5 approximately here> 
The results confirm the negative sign and the strong statistical significance of the Mills ratio and 
the IRB dummy coefficients. The coefficients of both variables are very close to their NLP ratio 
counterparts: the use of validated IRB models implies a 11% decrease in credit risk at bank level. 
This evidence further supports our hypothesis that IRB-banks managed credit risk better than SA-
banks showing that our findings are robust to the proxy of credit risk used. 
Our second robustness check addresses the potential issue of bank size. As previously argued, 
large banks may have a stronger incentive to apply for IRB validation.   This intuition is to some 
extent supported by the significance of the predictor SIZE in the full sample treatment equation 
results (Table 4 Panel A). We thus estimate our model on a subsample made of the ‘large banks’, 
i.e. those banks that display a value of their total assets over the sample median. Results are 
reported in Table 6 and are in line with our main findings
20
. We find that IRB banks of the same 
size-class display a superior ability in managing credit risk, thus discarding the concern that other 
unobserved factors driven by bank size may bias our conclusions. 
<Table 6 approximately here> 
We are also concerned about the possibility that IRB banks enjoy a lower increase in credit risk 
because they are more risk adverse than SA banks. It might be that an initial better quality of their 
loan portfolio has allowed them to better weather the recession. To investigate the validity of this 
concern, we split our sample according to the level of the NPL ratio at 2007, i.e.  year zero, before 
the beginning of the observation period. Thus, we isolate ‘less risky banks’, i.e. banks with a NPL 
ratio under the median value. Our estimates are reported in Table 7 and confirm the significance 
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 We do not report the selection equation results for the robustness check, but they are available upon request. 
20
 We have also performed the same analysis on the subsample of ‘smaller banks’, but due to the low frequency 
of IRB banks in this subsample we are not able to identify the Mills ratio from the selection equation where the 
dependent variable is almost always zero. 
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and the negative sign of the IRB dummy coefficient on this subsample thus providing evidence that 
IRB validation did make a significant   difference among banks with low risk attitude and a high 
quality loan portfolio as well. 
<Table 7 approximately here> 
A number of studies have analyzed the impact of business cycle and credit cycle on credit risk 
(Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Quagliarello and Marcucci, 2009) 
finding significant evidences that credit risk reacts differently to the same drivers during downturns 
and expansions. Our sample statistics (Table 2) show that IRB banks on average display a lower 
loans growth rate over the whole sample period and this evidence raises concern as to whether the 
lower increase in credit risk experienced by IRB banks may be due to the credit cycle phase. To 
address the potential business cycle driven asymmetric effect, we split our observation period into 
two sub-periods. The first one goes from 2008 to 2013 and the second one from 2014 to 2015. 
Starting from 2014 we observe a recovery in loan growth in the European banking system
21
, 
therefore the first sub-period identifies the negative part of the credit and economic cycle, while the 
second sub-period captures the recovery of credit and economic cycle. We report results for the 
recession period only since the recovery phase is too short to obtain significant estimates. In line 
with the credit cycle literature, Table 8 confirms that the impact of macro variables on credit risk 
during a recession is much stronger. However, the Mills ratio and IRB dummy are significant and 
negative and display both a small increase with respect to the whole period, which suggest that 
when the general economic context deteriorates, validated internal models displays a greater 
effectiveness and accuracy.  
<Table 8 approximately here> 
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 See ECB Economic Bullettin, n.4/2017, p.29 “The recovery in loan growth to the private sector observed since 
the beginning of 2014 is proceeding…”. Besides, according to CEPR Euro Area Business Cycle Dating Committee 
Announcements “the trough of the recession that started after the 2011Q3 peak has been reached in 2013Q1”. This 
means that 2014 is a turning –point also for the economic cycle.  
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In order to deepen our understanding of the impact of the credit cycle and of the lending 
behavior on credit risk we test our model also on two subsamples of banks constructed on the base 
of the stance of their lending policy during the negative phase of the credit cycle. We  divide the 
‘more conservative banks’,  i.e. banks with average growth rate of gross loans (GLGR) over the 
period 2008-2013 below the sample median, from the ‘less conservative banks’, i.e. banks with 
values above the sample median (Table 9). As previously mentioned, during this period banks have 
reduced their credit supply due to the negative economic context and the expected increase in credit 
risk. We may therefore suspect that IRB banks have not avoided a sharp increase in credit risk 
because of their stronger ability in selecting and managing credit risk, but simply because they have 
been more conservative and have diminished their credit supply. Our results  show that even 
comparing banks with similar lending policies, IRB banks enjoy a lower increase in NPL ratio, thus 
supporting the view that validated internal models are indeed more effective. The hypothesis that 
IRB banks have identified and selected their borrowers more accurately and have granted new loans 
only to safer customers thanks to the higher discriminatory power of IRB models, is consistent with 
Mascia et al. (2016) and Bruno et al. (2016), who find that during the crisis IRB banks have moved 
towards safer borrowers, according to a “fly to quality” strategy. Finally, this finding is also 
consistent with those of Behn et al. (2016) who find that during the recent financial crisis German 
IRB banks reduced their credit offer more than SA banks. 
<Table 9 approximately here> 
Finally, the IRB adoption process is a time consuming process which takes on average several 
years. Clearly, this implies that IRB is not a sharp treatment. The timing of the treatment might be 
difficult to identify since there is no information available in public sources on whether a bank has 
initiated the validation process. The validation process itself is latent: we can only assume that 
during the period that goes from the application for validation until the validation itself the quality 
of the internal models may increase gradually. We address the concern on the non-sharp nature of 
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the treatment by identifying the significance of IRB models using between banks variation only. We 
estimate the models on the restricted sample of banks which do not switch from the SA approach to 
the IRB approach during the period of interest
22
. Thus, we eliminate any potential noise arising in 
the sample by the efficiency improvement of the switching banks and we rely only on between 
banks variations. Note that none of the SA banks considered in this subsample obtains IRB in 2016. 
Our estimates are reported in Table 10 and confirm the robustness of the previous findings: the 
coefficient of the IRB dummy is significant and has a similar magnitude also for this sub sample of 
banks. This evidence confirms that IRB banks face a lower deterioration of their loan portfolio and 
that IRB validated models are superior.  
 <Table 10 approximately here> 
 
6. Conclusions  
The introduction of risk-sensitive capital charges and the possibility for banks to use internal 
ratings (IRB) models to calculate risk weights represent one of the more important novelties in 
banking prudential regulation. Since the introduction of the IRB regulatory framework, several 
issues on its design and implementation have been raised, urging regulators to revise technical 
features of the validation process.  
While a growing body of literature discusses the alleged flaws of the IRB regulation, the ability 
of validated internal models to contribute to the adoption of stronger risk management practices has 
not been thoroughly investigated. This paper addresses such question and investigates whether, as 
meant by regulators, the introduction of the IRB approach has promoted the diffusion of stronger 
risk management practices among banks. We assess banks credit risk management accuracy and 
effectiveness by looking at risk management output, i.e. the level of risk borne by a bank, proxied 
by the NPL ratio and we provide an empirical investigation based on a novel panel data set  of 177 
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 In our sample only 23 banks out of 177 switch from SA to IRB during the period under analysis (Table 3). 
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Western European banks for the 2008-2015 period. Our empirical strategy relies on a dynamic two 
stage Heckman procedure. We control for the potential endogeneity arising from the IRB dummy in 
the credit risk equation with an inverse Mills ratio obtained from a dynamic Probit first stage 
equation. The significance of the IRB dummy in the credit risk equation supports our research 
hypothesis: in the period under analysis, the use of validated IRB models allowed banks to curb the 
deterioration of their loan portfolio, limiting the negative impact of the economic downturn that 
followed the great financial crisis. IRB banks managed to adopt more conservative lending policies 
by selecting their borrowers more accurately and granting new loans to safer customers. IRB 
models have thus been accurate and effective in managing credit risk. The significance of the 
inverse Mills ratio confirms that this result is due to the adoption of sounder and more robust credit 
risk management procedures among banks as meant by Basel II. Our analysis sheds also light on the 
validation process, confirming that large and more efficient and profitable banks are more likely to 
obtain validation.  
Overall, our results contribute to the growing debate on the use of the IRB approach by 
regulators and support the hypothesis that validated IRB models are accurate and robust in the 
evaluation of credit risk. Our conclusions are in line with the view of the European banking 
authorities who have reiterated that risk-sensitive internal models should remain the first driver of 
capital requirements and have issued a plan of technical adjustments aimed at restoring the 
reliability and consistency of the IRB approach. Finally, our findings suggest that the huge 
investments required to a bank in terms of data, risk management tools and procedures and human 
capital to obtain the validation of its internal models may be justified not only by a capital saving 
for low-risk exposures, but also by a more accurate credit risk evaluation and eventually a lower 
burden of NPLs.  
An interesting issue that we do not address is whether the overall bank risk management 
effectiveness improves after the validation of its internal rating models. As a matter of fact, the 
26 
 
authorization to use IRB models for regulatory purposes may concern only a share of the loan 
portfolio, e.g. portfolios including only retail or corporate exposures or mortgages, etc.. As the bank 
risk management tools and procedures become more accurate, supervisors may allow the bank to 
shift from SA to IRB other shares of the loan portfolio and may also allow for a shift from 
Foundation IRB (F-IRB) to Advanced IRB (A-IRB). Further research may shed light on this issue 
by accounting more specifically for the adoption of F-IRB vs A-IRB over time and for the shares of 
loan portfolios under either of these models.  
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Table 1   
Variables, their definition, source and expected sign  
Name Description Source Expected sign 
NPL_GL  
Non-performing loans on gross loans as measure of 
bank’s asset quality  
Bankscope / 
LLP_GL 
Loan loss provisions on gross loans as measure of 
bank’s asset quality 
Bankscope / 
IRB  
Dummy variable that equals 1 if bank uses validated 
IRB model  
SNL Unlimited  Negative 
ROAE  
Return over average equity as measure of banks’ 
profitability 
Bankscope Negative 
C_I  
Total operating costs over total operating income as 
measure of cost efficiency 
Bankscope  Positive/Negative 
E_TA  
Equity over total assets as measure of banks’ 
capitalization 
Bankscope  Positive/negative 
GLGR  
Growth rate of Gross Loans as measure of propensity 
to offer loans. 
Bankscope  Negative 
LP 
Loan premium, calculated as the difference between 
the bank average interest rate applied on bank loans 
(measured as the interest income on gross loans 
divided by the average of gross loans at time t-1 and t) 
and the interest rate on 10-years Government Bond of 
the respective country. 
Bankscope and European 
Central Bank (Statistical Data 
Warehouse) 
Positive 
GL_TA 
Gross Loans over Total Assets as measure of banks’ 
business model 
Bankscope Positive 
II_GR 
Interest Income over Gross Revenues as measure of 
banks’ business model 
Bankscope Positive 
RWA 
Risk weighted assets on total assets as measure of risk 
appetite as measure of banks’ risk appetite 
Bankscope 
 
TCR Total capital ratio as measure of banks’ capitalization Bankscope  
SIZE 
Natural logarithm of total assets as measure of banks’ 
size 
Bankscope   
DREC 
Dummy variable that equals 1 for years from 2013 to 
2015, i.e. years when the aggregate level of NPL fro 
European banks has started to decrease 
 
Positive 
GDP  Growth of GDP at the bank’s country-level  Eurostat Negative 
HPI  House price index at the bank’s country-level  Eurostat Negative 
UN  Unemployment rate at the banks’ country level  Eurostat Positive 
This Table reports the variables used in our analysis, their meaning, the source and the sign expected. Where the 
expected sign is not reported, it means that the variable is used only in the Probit regression and not in the GMM. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of the total sample and the two subsamples IRB and SA Banks (2008-
2015) 
  N. OBSERVATIONS MEAN MEDIAN SD 
 
TOT SA IRB TOT SA IRB TOT SA IRB TOT SA IRB 
IRB  1,412 - - 0.6339 - - 1 - - 0.4819 - - 
LLP_GL (%) 1,385 497 883 0.7137 0.8141* 0.6564* 0.3911 0.55 0.34 1.722 1.215 1.952 
NPL_GL (%) 1,353 468 880 5.215 6.644*** 4.453*** 3.217 4.16 2.87 5.956 7.402 4.855 
ROAE (%) 1,387 500 883 1.99 0.7731* 2.673* 5.173 15.31 21.69 19.61 3.894 5.833 
C_I (%) 1,363 490 866 64.15 66.54*** 62.85*** 62.28 65.65 60.17 23.7 25.03 22.91 
E_TA (%) 1,391 501 886 6.45 6.358 6.497 5.991 6.27 5.879 3.377 2.677 3.715 
GRGL (%) 1,371 490 877 3.818 4.78* 3.273* 2.594 3.08 2.407 15.96 17.86 14.82 
LP (%) 1,359 489 861 0.533 0.3483** 0.6388** 0.630 0.6203 0.6376 2.085 1.86 2.2 
GL_TA (%) 1,382 494 884 63.43 67.75*** 61.01*** 66.82 71.45 63.84 18.83 18.22 18.73 
II_GR (%) 1,364 485 872 68.27 70.33 67.14 65.46 69.34 62.49 38.93 38.81 39.12 
RWA (%) 1,298 486 808 44.7 53.45*** 39.35*** 43.45 58.38 38.78 18.18 19.01 15.32 
TCR (%) 1,285 482 799 15.57 14.26*** 16.37*** 14.07 12.95 14.7 7.527 7.114 7.674 
TA (bn. Euro) 1,395 503 888 192.92 36.543*** 282.026*** 39.22 17.675 84.490 384.83 47.837 457.765 
GDP (%) 1,062 - - 1.569 - - 1.7 - - 3.388 - - 
UN (%) 1,416 - - 5.281 - - 5.1 - - 2.229 - - 
HPI  1,342 - - 101.9 - - 100.7 - - 10.23 - - 
This Table reports the descriptive statistics for the total sample and for the subsamples of IRB- and SA-banks, during 
the period 2008-2015. IRB is a dummy variable equal to 1 if banks adopt IRB model, 0 otherwise; TA is the total assets 
of banks as measure of size (expressed in billions euro); LLP_GL is the loan loss provisions on gross loans (%) and 
NPL_GL is the non-performing loans on gross  loans (%); ROAE the return on average equity (%); C_I is the cost 
income ratio (%); E_TA is the equity on total assets (%); GRGL is the growth of gross loans year on year (%); LP is the 
loan premium (%) calculated as the difference between the bank average interest rate applied on bank loans (measured 
as the interest income on gross loans divided by the average of gross loans at time t-1 and t) and the interest rate on 10-
years Government Bond of the respective country; GL_TA is the gross loans on total assets (%) and II_GR is the 
interest income on gross revenues (%); RWA is the risk weighted assets on total assets (%); TCR is the total capital 
ratio (%); TA is the total assets expressed in billions of euro. The macroeconomic variables are: GDP that is the growth 
gross domestic product (%), the unemployment rate (UN) (%) and the house price index (HPI). 
***, ** and * indicate that the differences between the two means are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels 
respectively.  
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Table 3  
IRB vs. SA approach. Number of banks in the full sample and divided by year and country. 
  2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Sample total 
assets/Total Asset of 
banking system (% at 
31/12/2015) 
TOTAL 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 177 62.62 
SA  75 70 67 65 64 60 60 56   
IRB 98 107 110 112 113 117 117 121   
Austria 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 72.61 
SA 7 7 7 7 7 6 6 5   
IRB 3 3 3 3 3 4 4 5   
Belgium 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 96.78 
SA 1               
 IRB 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8   
Denmark 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 72.87 
SA 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3   
IRB 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7   
Finland 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 41.37 
SA 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1   
IRB 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 3   
France 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 41 86.46 
SA 7 5 4 4 4 4 4 4   
IRB 32 36 37 37 37 37 37 37   
Germany 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 22 63.57 
SA 12 12 12 11 11 10 10 10   
IRB 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 12   
Great Britain 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 45.69 
SA 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 6   
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IRB 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 11   
Ireland 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 83.36 
SA 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2   
IRB 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3   
Italy 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 27 74.98 
SA 23 22 22 21 20 18 18 17   
IRB 4 5 5 6 7 9 9 10   
Netherland 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 37.54 
SA 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1   
IRB 5 5 6 6 6 6 6 6   
Norway 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 83.48 
SA 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 2   
IRB 6 6 7 7 7 7 7 7   
Portugal 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 51.04 
SA 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3   
IRB 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2   
Spain 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 41.49 
SA 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2   
IRB 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4   
Sweden 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 91.87 
IRB 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 6   
Note: SA = Banks that compute regulatory capital requirement using the standardized approach; IRB = Banks that compute regulatory capital requirement using their validated 
internal models 
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Table 4  
Panel A – Propensity to adopt validated IRB 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
IRBt-1 0.769*** 0.802*** 0.791*** 0.776*** 0.790*** 0.783*** 0.764*** 0.755*** 
ROAEt-1 0.021** 0.018* 0.020** 0.020** 0.016** 0.022** 0.023** 0.019* 
ROAE2 
t-1 0.004* 0.003* 0.007* 0.006* 0.004* 0.007* 0.007* 0.009* 
  C_It-1 -0.263*** -0.287** -0.275** -0.257*** -0.285** - -0.262* - 
C_I2 
t-1 -0.111*** -0.116** -0.111** -0.109** -0.112** 
 
-0.113** 
 
E_TAt-1 -0.145*** -0.151** -0.155*** -0.157** -0.158*** -0.053*** -0.148** -0.162** 
E_TA2 
t-1 -0.021* -0.033* -0.032* -0.030** -0.030* -0.036* -0.028* -0.027* 
GLGRt-1 - 0.001* 0.007* - 0.003* 0.003* - 0.002* 
GLGR2 
t-1 - 0.003* 0.005* - 0.006* 0.003* - 0.005* 
LP t-1 - - - 0.019* 0.022* - - - 
LP2 t-1 
 
GL_TA t-1 
 
 
 
0.056** 
 
 
 
0.052** 
 
 
 
0.053** 
0.011* 
 
0.054** 
0.009 
 
0.055** 
 
 
 
- 
 
 
 
0.053** 
 
 
 
- 
GL_TA2 t-1 0.013* 0.011* 0.015* 0.014** 0.007* 
 
0.012* 
 
II_GRt-1 - - - - - 0.023* - 0.022* 
II_GR2 
t-1 
     
0.008* 
 
0.006* 
GDPt-1 0.002* 0.004* 0.001 0.003* 0.005* 0.003* 0.007* 0.002 
 
 
RWA_TAt-1 
 
 
 
-0.046** 
 
 
 
-0.048** 
 
 
 
-0.052** 
 
 
 
-0.048** 
 
 
-0.055** 
 
 
 
-0.052** 
 
 
 
-0.051*** 
 
 
 
-0.053*** 
TCRt-1 -0.027** -0.022** -0.032** -0.031** -0.028* -0.024** -0.031* -0.028** 
SIZEt-1 0.036** 0.033** 0.037** 0.035** 0.041** 0.038*** 0.040** 0.043*** 
N: obs. 1239 1239 1239 1239 1239 1239 1239 1239 
Log-Likelihood -17843.05 -16574.33 17054.21 16885.53 -18993.34 -17654.23 -16567.20 -17111.28 
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Panel B - Determinants of NPL ratio 
Variables    Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
NPL_GLt-1 0.283*** 0.289** 0.301*** 0.278** 0.311*** 0.299** 0.312*** 0.275*** 
 
(0.000) (0.024) (0.005) (0.030) (0.005) (0.026) (0.004) (0.007) 
IMRt-1 -0.022*** -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.018*** -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.011*** -0.026*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) 
IRBt-1 -.111*** -.112*** -.116*** -.111** -0.110*** -.106*** -.113** -.108*** 
 
(0.005) (0.000) (0.000) (0.021) (0.000) (0.005) (0.013) (0.000) 
ROAEt-1 -0.045* -0.046** -0.043** -0.047** -0.046* -0.045* -0.040* -0.042** 
 
(0.062) (0.040) (0.041) (0.042) (0.084) (0.067) (0.086) (0.048) 
C_It-1 0.320*** 0.318** 0.311*** 0.315** 0.316*** - 0.322*** - 
 
(0.004) (0.020) (0.000) (0.032) (0.003) 
 
(0.001) 
 
E_TAt-1 0.225*** 0.234** 0.274** 0.256** 0.233*** 0.238*** 0.227*** 0.230** 
 
(0.005) (0.027) (0.013) (0.028) (0.004) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) 
GLGRt-1 - 0.070*** 0.071** - 0.073** 0.068** - 0.070*** 
  
(0.007) (0.017) 
 
(0.031) (0.035) 
 
(0.009) 
LP t-1 - - - 0.133** 0.130** - - - 
    
(0.027) (0.025) 
   
GL_TA t-1 0.044** 0.041** 0.040** 0.045** 0.046** - 0.045** - 
 
(0.043) (0.036) (0.041) (0.047) (0.048) 
 
(0.042) 
 
II_GRt-1 - - - - - 0.065** - 0.061** 
      
(0.027) 
 
(0.036) 
GDPt-1 -0.324*** -0.389*** -0.337*** -0.342*** -0.334*** -0.324*** -0.385*** -0.333*** 
 
(0.001) (0.005) (0.009) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.008) (0.005) 
UNt-1 0.135*** 0.138** 0.133*** 0.135*** 0.130*** 0.136*** 0.133*** 0.134** 
 
(0.005) (0.011) (0.002) (0.008) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) (0.015) 
HPIt-1 -0.055** -0.050** -0.044** -0.051** -0.048** -0.047** -0.050** -0.051** 
 
(0.037) (0.019) (0.042) (0.038) (0.028) (0.038) (0.041) (0.033) 
 DRECt - - - 
0.002* 
- - - 
0.003* 
(0.053) (0.076) 
 Country 
Yes - Yes Yes - Yes - Yes 
 Dummies  
N. Obs. 1239               
Hansen Test 0.765 0.782 0.767 0.803 0.777 0.793 0.756 0.779 
Sargan Test             0.331 0.323 0.432 0.411 0.388 0.411 0.336 0.376 
AR(1) 0.271 0.235 0.268 0.249 0.238 0.267 0.291 0.265 
AR(2) 0.554 0.543 0.544 0.578 0.532 0.567 0.576 0.561 
Wald chi-sq 
test        
1236 1335 1765 1198 1245 1126 1250 1178 
Panel A reports the results of the dynamic selection equation and reports the Quasi Maximum Likelihood estimates of the 
dynamic Probit selection equation. Convergence is achieved at the 11th iteration. The covariance matrix used is Sandwich 
and the Quadrature method is the Gaussian Quadrature with 26 points. The reported Log-Likelihood values suggest that this 
first stage equation is highly significant as a predictive equation. The dependent variable is the IRB dummy equals to 1 if 
bank adopts IRB approach, 0 otherwise.  
Panel B reports the results of the System GMM estimates for the main equation for different baseline model specifications. 
The reported number of observations refers to the level equation. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of non-performing loans on gross loans as measure of bank’s asset quality (NPL/GL). The 
IMR is the Inverse Mills ratio at time t-1. Explanatory variables are: the dummy variable IRB at time t-1 that equals 1 if bank 
adopts the internal rating based approach; the return on average equity ratio at time t-1 (ROAE); the cost to income ratio at 
time t-1 (C_I); the equity over total assets at time t-1 (E_TA); the growth rate of gross loans at time t-1 (GLGR); the loan 
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premium at time t-1 (LP) calculated as the difference between the bank average interest rate applied on bank loans (measured 
as the interest income on gross loans divided by the average of gross loans at time t-1 and t) and the interest rate on 10-years 
Government Bond of the respective country; the gross loans over total assets ratio at time t-1 (GL_TA)  and the interest 
income divided by gross revenues at time t-1 (II_GR); the GDP growth rate at country level at time t-1. In addition, in Panel 
A:  the Natural Logarithm of total assets at time t-1 (SIZE), RWA density, i.e. RWAs divided by Total Assets at time t-1 
(RWA) and Total Capital Ratio at time t-1 (TCR). In Panel B: Unemployment rate (UN), House Price Index (HPI) and the 
dummy variable for the recovery period that takes value 1 only in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (DREC) and Country dummies. 
***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 5 
Determinants of LLP ratio 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
LLP_GLt-1 0.332** 0.335*** 0.328** 0.337*** 0.331** 0.233** 0.334** 0.230*** 
 
(0.022) (0.000) (0.026) (0.008) (0.028) (0.030) (0.033) (0.005) 
IMRt-1 -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.019*** -0.017** -0.021*** -0.018** -0.021** -0.019*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) (0.005) (0.031) (0.022) (0.006) 
IRBt-1 -0.118*** -0.116*** -0.120*** -0.119*** -0.121*** -0.122** -0.120** -0.118*** 
 
(0.000) (0.007) (0.005) (0.009) (0.000) (0.030) (0.005) (0.000) 
ROAEt-1 -0.040** -0.042** -0.041** -0.042** -0.041* -0.040** -0.042* -0.038* 
 
(0.048) (0.025) (0.036) (0.027) (0.046) (0.038) (0.057) (0.058) 
C_It-1 0.342*** 0.336*** 0.340** 0.335** 0.331*** - 0.338*** - 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.016) (0.018) (0.000) 
 
(0.000) 
 
E_TAt-1 0.252*** 0.255** 0.258** 0.541*** 0.554*** 0.548*** 0.562*** 0.555*** 
 
(0.000) (0.01) (0.012) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.000) 
GLGRt-1 - 0.060** 0.061** - 0.063** 0.061** - 0.062** 
  
(0.035) (0.040) 
 
(0.031) (0.038) 
 
(0.026) 
LP t-1 - - - 0.125* 0.127* - - - 
    
(0.072) (0.081) 
   
GL_TA t-1 0.048*** 0.050** 0.047** 0.044** 0.050** - 0.047** - 
 
(0.007) (0.029) (0.026) (0.033) (0.026) 
 
(0.047) 
 
II_GRt-1 - - - - - 0.052* - 0.050* 
      
(0.068) 
 
(0.071) 
GDPt-1 -0.384*** -0.385*** -0.383** -0.385*** -0.387*** -0.381*** -0.380*** -0.383*** 
 
(0.000) (0.004) (0.10) (0.006) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) 
UNt-1 0.134** 0.128** 0.133** 0.129** 0.132*** 0.133** 0.135** 0.128** 
 
(0.035) (0.032) (0.036) (0.028) (0.009) (0.024) (0.027) (0.014) 
HPIt-1 -0.045** -0.047** -0.048** -0.043** -0.049** -0.043* -0.050* -0.051** 
 
(0.08) (0.033) (0.028) (0.041) (0.042) (0.057) (0.061) (0.048) 
         
DRECt - - 
-0.006* 
- - - - 
-0.007* 
(0.057) (0.083) 
Coutry  
Yes - Yes Yes - Yes - Yes 
dummy 
N. Obs. 1239               
Hansen test 0.567 0.558 0.632 0.687 0.654 0.765 0.669 0.554 
AR(1) 0.266 0.257 0.227 0.238 0.259 0.234 0.287 0.220 
AR(2) 0.555    0.632 0.671 0.521 0.647 0.283 0.776 0.631 
Wald chi-sq 
t          
1345.6 1453.4 1444.5 1387.5 1458.2 1378.8 1229.0 1765.3 
Sargan 0.387 0.371 0.445 0.492 0.466             0.365 0.334 0.357 
 
This Table reports the results of the System GMM estimates for the main equation for different specifications of our baseline 
model. We report the number of observations for the equation in levels. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of loan loss provisions on gross loans as measure of bank’s asset quality (LLP/GL). The 
IMR is the Inverse Mills ratio at time t-1. Explanatory variables are: the instrumenting variable LLP_GL at time t-1; the 
dummy variable IRB at time t-1 that equals 1 if bank adopts the internal rating based approach; the return on average equity 
ratio at time t-1 (ROAE) and the cost to income ratio at time t-1 (C_I); the equity over total assets at time t-1 (E_TA), the 
growth rate of gross loans at time t-1 (GLGR); the loan premium at time t-1 (LP) calculated as the difference between the 
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bank average interest rate applied on bank loans (measured as the interest income on gross loans divided by the average of 
gross loans at time t-1 and t) and the interest rate on 10-years Government Bond of the respective country; the gross loans 
over total assets ratio at time t-1 (GL_TA) and the interest income divided by gross revenues at time t-1 (II_GR); the GDP 
growth rate at country level at time t-1, the unemployment rate at time t-1 (UN) and the house price index at time t-1 (HPI). A 
dummy variable for the recovery period that takes value 1 only in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (DREC) and Country dummies. 
***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
40 
 
Table 6 
Determinants of NPL ratio for the subsample of ‘Larger Banks’ 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
NPL_GLt-1 0.221** 0.225*** 0.227*** 0.220** 0.226** 0.230** 0.228** 0.227*** 
 
(0.035) (0.011) (0.008) (0.030) (0.047) (0.034) (0.011) (0.012) 
IMRt -0.018** -.015*** -0.016** -0.017*** -0.016** -.0021** -.016** -.015** 
 
(0.033) (0.008) (0.015) (0.006) (0.042) (0.040) (0.387) (0.033) 
IRBt -0.0913*** -0.0891** -0.0884*** -0.0901*** -0.0902*** -0.0868** -0.0875** -0.0874** 
 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) (0.018) (0.026) (0.034) 
ROAEt-1 -0.042** -0.043 * -0.046* -0.040** -0.042** -0.044** -0.040* -0.041** 
 
(0.036) (0.075) (0.083) (0.040) (0.037) (0.029) (0.055) (0.036) 
C_It-1 0.311*** 0.308** 0.315*** 0.322** 0.308*** - 0.319*** - 
 
(0.003) (0.035) (0.007) (0.027) (0.0077) 
 
(0.008) 
 
E_TAt-1 0.183* 0.193** 0.180** 0.191** 0.187** 0.188** 0.185* 0.194** 
 
(0.072) (0.036) (0.011) (0.028) (0.018) (0.041) (0.057) (0.043) 
GLGRt-1 - 0.060** 0.062** - 0.058*** 0.061* - 0.058** 
  
(0.037) (0.036) 
 
(0.003) (0.071) 
 
(0.040) 
LP t-1 - - - 0.127** 0.125* - - - 
    
(0.028) (0.055) 
   
GL_TA t-1 0.023** 0.024** 0.025* 0.021** 0.026** - 0.022** - 
 
(0.043) (0.476) (0.057) (0.043) (0.037) 
 
(0.047) 
 
II_GRt-1 - - - - - 0.050* - 0.056* 
      
(0.065) 
 
(0.068) 
GDPt-1 -0.346*** -0.332*** -0.341** -0.352*** -0.343*** -0.353*** -0.338** -0.271*** 
 
(0.007) (0.008) (0.031) (0.007) (0.009) (0.007) (0.011) (0.009) 
UNt-1 0.131*** 0.151*** 0.127*** 0.158** 0.115*** 0.148** 0.147*** 0.152** 
 
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.028) (0.007) (0.048) (0.009) (0.017) 
HPIt-1 -0.031*** -0.033** -0.032** -0.037* -0.039*** -0.029** -0.035* -0.034** 
 
(0.009) (0.015) (0.007) (0.057) (0.009) (0.047) (0.088) (0.049) 
DRECt - - - 
-0.003 
- - - 
-.002** 
(0.114) (0.085) 
Country 
Yes - Yes Yes - Yes -          Yes 
Effect 
N. Obs. 1239               
Hansen test 0.652 0.732 0.777 0.681 0.716 0.683 0.711 0.723 
AR(1) 0.327 321 0.386 0.365 0.352 0.289 0.365 0.338 
AR(2) 0.668 0.562 0.611 0.543 0.558 0.534 0.550 0.558 
Wald chi_sq              1567 1665 1347 1579 1632 1363 1329 1324 
Sargan 0.331 0.354 0.332 0.361 0.358 0.401 0.337 0.396 
This Table reports the results of the System GMM estimates for the main equation for different specifications of our baseline 
model on a subsample made of the ‘large banks’, i.e. those banks that display a value of their total asset over the sample 
median. The dependent variable is the ratio of non-performing loans on gross loans as measure of bank’s asset quality 
(NPL/GL). The IMR is the Inverse Mills ratio at time t-1. Explanatory variables are: the instrumenting variable NPL_GL at 
time t-1; the dummy variable IRB at time t-1 that equals 1 if bank adopts the internal rating based approach; the return on 
average equity ratio at time t-1 (ROAE) and the cost to income ratio at time t-1 (C_I); the equity over total assets at time t-1 
(E_TA) , the growth rate of gross loans at time t-1 (GLGR); the loan premium at time t-1 (LP) calculated as the difference 
between the bank average interest rate applied on bank loans (measured as the interest income on gross loans divided by the 
average of gross loans at time t-1 and t) and the interest rate  on 10-years Government Bond of the respective country; the 
gross loans over total assets ratio at time t-1 (GL_TA) and the interest income divided by gross revenues at time t-1 (II_GR); 
the GDP growth rate at country level at time t-1, the unemployment rate at time t-1 (UN) and the house price index at time t-
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1 (HPI). A dummy variable for the recovery period that takes value 1 only in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (DREC) and Country 
dummies. 
***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 7 
Determinants of NPL ratio for the subsample of ‘Less risky banks’ 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
NPL_GLt-1 0.225** 0.228*** 0.222** 0.227** 0.224*** 0.225*** 0.228*** 0.219*** 
 
(0.042) (0.009) (0.021) (0.036) (0.008) (0.000) (0.002) (0.004) 
IMRt-1 -0.017*** -0.018** -0.019** -0.016** -0.020** -0.018** -0.019** -0.018** 
 
(0.008) (0.032) (0.036) (0.044) (0.035) (0.050) (0.046) (0.028) 
IRBt-1 -0.116** -0.114*** -0.115** -0.109*** -0.116*** -0.113** -0.111** -0.103*** 
 
(0.033) (0.008) (0.031) (0.003) (0.032) (0.037) (0.042) (0.005) 
ROAEt-1 -0.048* -0.047* -0.043* -0.045* -0.040* -0.042* -0.043** -0.044* 
 
(0.066) (0.075) (0.083) (0.062) (0.075) (0.061) (0.048) (0.064) 
C_It-1 0.312*** 0.308*** 0.315** 0.317** 0.314*** - 0.316*** - 
 
(0.005) (0.000) (0.015) (0.028) (0.008) 
 
(0.007) 
 
E_TAt-1 0.151*** 0.148** 0.154*** 0.152*** 0.156** 0.148** 0.149*** 0.151* 
 
(0.000) (0.032) (0.002) (0.007) (0.044) (0.035) (0.009) (0.053) 
GLGRt-1 - 0.071* - - 0.072* 0.070** - 0.073** 
  
(0.076) 
  
(0.064) (0.332) 
 
(0.032) 
LP t-1 - - - 0.128* 0.133** - - - 
    
(0.055) (0.048) 
   
GL_TAt-1 0.028** 0.023* 0.027* 0.028*** 0.026** - 0.024** - 
 
(0.033) (0.055) (0.057) (0.008) (0.029) 
 
(0.033) 
 
II_GRt-1 - - - - - 0.060** - 0.062* 
      
(0.058) 
 
(0.072) 
GDPt-1 -0.348*** -0.352*** -0.354*** -0.350*** -0.356*** -0.351*** -0.355** -0.356*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.027) (0.000) 
UNt-1 0.095** 0.009** 0.103*** 0.093** 0.095*** 0.097* 0.104*** 0.112** 
 
(0.046) (0.032) (0.007) (0.038) (0.008) (0.058) (0.000) (0.044) 
HPIt-1 -0.067*** -0.063*** -0.070*** -0.060** -0.068** -0.063*** -0.065*** -0.070*** 
 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.085) (0.032) (0.027) (0.038) (0.042) (0.000) 
DRECt - - -. 
-0.003*           - 
       - - 
-0.004 
(0.098)   (0.145) 
Country                                                               
  Yes  - Yes Yes - Yes Yes - 
effect           
N. Obs. 1239               
Hansen 0.663 0.674 0.772 0.685 0.752 0.775 0.665 0.753 
AR(1) 0.228 0.237 0.303 0.267 0.285 0.233 0.276 0.301 
AR(2) 0.555 0.542 0.512 0.533 0.534 0.542 0.568 0.559 
Wald chi_sq       1224 1347 1567 1339 1470 1225 1324 1203 
Sargan 0.335                      0.456 0.432 0.339 0.453                
0.381      
0.453                         
   0.337 
Table reports results of the System GMM estimates on a subsample made of the ‘less risky banks’, i.e. those banks that at 
the end of 2007 display a value of their NPL ratio under the sample median. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of non-performing loans on gross loans as measure of bank’s asset quality (NPL/GL). 
The IMR is the Inverse Mills ratio at time t-1. Explanatory variables are: the instrumenting variable NPL_GL at time t-1; 
the dummy variable IRB at time t-1 that equals 1 if bank adopts the internal rating based approach; the return on average 
equity ratio at time t-1 (ROAE) and the cost to income ratio at time t-1 (C_I); the equity over total assets at time t-1 
(E_TA), the growth rate of gross loans at time t-1 (GLGR); the loan premium at time t-1 (LP) calculated as the difference 
between the bank average interest rate applied on bank loans (measured as the interest income on gross loans divided by 
the average of gross loans at time t-1 and t) and the interest rate  on 10-years Government Bond of the respective country; 
the gross loans over total assets ratio at time t-1 (GL_TA) and the interest income divided by gross revenues at time t-1 
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(II_GR); the GDP growth rate at country level at time t-1, the unemployment rate at time t-1 (UN) and the house price 
index at time t-1 (HPI); A dummy variable for the recovery period that takes value 1 only in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (DREC) 
and Country dummies. 
***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 8 
Determinants of NPL ratio for the subperiod 2008-2013 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
NPL_GLt-1 0.334*** 0.327** 0.331** 0.351*** 0.320** 0.341*** 0.346** 0.337*** 
 
(0.000) (0.018) (0.029) (0.009) (0.023) (0.006) (0.012) (0.000) 
IMRt-1 -0.021** -0.024** -0.019*** 
-
0.025*** 
-0.022** -0.018** -0.023** -0.026** 
 
(0.033) (0.027) (0.000) (0.006) (0.041) (0.032) (0.015) (0.019) 
IRBt-1 -0.118*** -0.115** -0.113*** -0.121** -0.120*** 
-
0.110*** 
-0.117** 
-
0.112*** 
 
(0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.0021) (0.000) (0.000) (0.015) (0.000) 
ROAEt-1 -0.040* -0.033* -0.037* -0.041* -0.039* -0.042* -0.038* -0.035* 
 
(0.058) (0.064) (0.058) (0.063) (0.0755) (0.052) (0.063) (0.066) 
C_It-1 0.321** 0.337** 0.318** 0.329** 0.331*** - 0.338** - 
 
(0.040) (0.022) (0.037) (0.044) (0.008) 
 
(0.029) 
 
E_TAt-1 0.114*** 0.126*** 0.123*** 0.118** 0.115** 0.125** 0.120*** 0.157** 
 
(0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.032) (0.043) (0.078) (0.000) (0.042) 
GLGRt-1 - 0.098*** 0.101** - 0.095** 0.102** - 0.096** 
  
(0.007) (0.032) 
 
(0.037) (0.026) 
 
(0.032) 
LP t-1 - - - 0.073 0.076* - - - 
    
(0.109) (0.063) 
   
GL_TA t-1 0.047** 0.040* 0.042** 0.051** 0.043* - 0.042* - 
 
(0.036) (0.062) (0.041) (0.022) (0.065) 
 
(0.076) 
 
II_GRt-1 - - - - - 0.059* - 0.061* 
      
(0.083) 
 
(0.079) 
GDPt-1 -0.387*** 
-
0.394*** 
-0.382*** 
-
0.395*** 
-0.384*** 
-
0.392*** 
-
0.398*** 
-
0.397*** 
 
(0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
UNt-1 0.097** 0.102* 0.095* 0.093** 0.096** 0.102** 0.091* 0.229* 
 
(0.040) (0.076) (0.065) (0.043) (0.039) (0.048) (0.068) (0.067) 
HPIt-1 -0.116** 
-
0.118*** 
-0.109*** -0.112** -0.107*** -0.114** -0.104** 
-
0.108*** 
 
(0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.025) (0.000) (0.024) (0.028) (0.000) 
         
DREC - - 
- 
0.004* 
- 
- 
- 
0.006* 
   
(0.095) 
 
(0.087) 
     
Country  
Dummies  
Yes - Yes Yes - Yes - Yes 
N. Obs. 885               
Hansen test 0.768 0.681 0.658 0.666 0.782 0.754 0.765 0.758 
Sargan  test              0.576 0.632 0.643 0.555 0.532 0.524 0.531 0.567 
AR(1) 0.341 0.373 0.341 0.279 0.336 0.387 0.348 0.339 
AR(2) 0.661 0.634 0.643 0.658 0.601 0.589 0.596 0.578 
Wald chi-sq test 1267 1281 1254 1264 1238 1255 1256 1233 
Table reports results of the System GMM estimates on a subperiod 2008-2013. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of non-performing loans on gross loans as measure of bank’s asset quality (NPL/GL). 
The IMR is the Inverse Mills ratio at time t-1. Explanatory variables are: the instrumenting variable NPL_GL at time t-1; 
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the dummy variable IRB at time t-1 that equals 1 if bank adopts the internal rating based approach; the return on average 
equity ratio at time t-1 (ROAE) and the cost to income ratio at time t-1 (C_I); the equity over total assets at time t-1 
(E_TA), the growth rate of gross loans at time t-1 (GLGR); the loan premium at time t-1 (LP) calculated as the difference 
between the bank average interest rate applied on bank loans (measured as the interest income on gross loans divided by 
the average of gross loans at time t-1 and t) and the interest rate  on 10-years Government Bond of the respective country; 
the gross loans over total assets ratio at time t-1 (GL_TA) and the interest income divided by gross revenues at time t-1 
(II_GR) as measures of bank’s business model; the GDP growth rate at country level at time t-1, the unemployment rate at 
time t-1 (UN) and the house price index at time t-1 (HPI); a dummy variable for the recovery period that takes value 1 
only in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (DREC) and country dummies. 
***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 9  
Panel A - Determinants of NPL ratio for the subsample of ‘More conservative banks’ 
over the period 2008-2013 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
NPL_GLt-1 0.276** 0.282** 0.291** 0.273** 0.295* 0.291** 0.292** 0.235* 
 
(0.040) (0.041) (0.045) (0.043) (0.086) (0.048) (0.040) (0.076) 
IMRt-1 -0.016** -0.015** -0.017* -0.022* -0.024** -0.019** -0.018* -0.026* 
 
(0.047) (0.038) (0.082) (0.076) (0.043) (0.046) (0.095) (0.080) 
IRBt-1 -.102** -.109* -.118** -.113* -0.111** -.102** -.104* -.114** 
 
(0.039) (0.070) (0.049) (0.096) (0.047) (0.043) (0.092) (0.040) 
ROAEt-1 -0.046 -0.032* -0.044* -0.041* -0.038* -0.041* -0.038* -0.041* 
 
(0.134) (0.079) (0.083) (0.072) (0.091) (0.072) (0.086) (0.076) 
C_It-1 0.296* 0.305* 0.299* 0.283* 0.298** - 0.301** - 
 
(0.072) (0.070) (0.082) (0.072) (0.042) 
 
(0.045) 
 
E_TAt-1 0.219* 0.221* 0.224** 0.218** 0.217* 0.226* 0.219* 0.225* 
 
(0.083) (0.081) (0.037) (0.042) (0.071) (0.083) (0.072) (0.075) 
GLGRt-1 - 0.062* 0.063* - 0.064* 0.061 - 0.065* 
  
(0.073) (0.081) 
 
(0.085) (0.109) 
 
(0.067) 
LP t-1 - - - 0.131 0.135* - - - 
    
(0.113) (0.076) 
   
GL_TA t-1 0.047* 0.042* 0.046* 0.038 0.041* - 0.035* - 
 
(0.072) (0.081) (0.057) (0.101) (0.063) 
 
(0.072) 
 
II_GRt-1 - - - - - 0.068* - 0.072* 
      
(0.059) 
 
(0.068) 
GDPt-1 -0.324* -0.389* -0.337** -0.342** -0.334* -0.324* -0.385* -0.333** 
 
(0.061) (0.065) (0.042) (0.046) (0.069) (0.067) (0.051) (0.045) 
UNt-1 0.135* 0.138* 0.133* 0.135* 0.130* 0.136* 0.133* 0.134 
 
(0.072) (0.071) (0.062) (0.059) (0.053) (0.064) (0.068) (0.103) 
HPIt-1 -0.051* -0.048 -0.064* -0.043* -0.049 -0.049* -0.043* -0.051* 
 
(0.061) (0.119) (0.066) (0.062) (0.105) (0.060) (0.041) (0.073) 
DRECt - - - 
0.003 
- - - 
0.002 
(0.133) (0.135) 
County 
Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Dummies  
N. Obs. 567 
       
Hansen Test 0.553 0.521 0.528 0.551 0.537 0.534 0.572 0.503 
Sargan Test             0.323 0.311 0.308 0.364 0.313 0.335 0.311 0.329 
AR(1) 0.268 0.211 0.223 0.217 0.209 0.237 0.217 0.222 
AR(2) 0.283 0.236 0.264 0.259 0.267 0.211 0.244 0.254 
Wald chi-sq 
test        
1196 11172 1168 1110 1201 1004 1123 1006 
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Panel B - Determinants of NPL ratio for the subsample of ‘Less conservative banks’ 
over the period 2008-2013 
 
Variables 
Model 
1 
Model 
2 
Model 
3 
Model 
4 
Model 
5 
Model 
6 
Model 
7 
Model 
8 
NPL_GLt-1 0.271* 0.269** 0.284** 0.266* 0.283** 0.288* 0.263* 0.269** 
 
(0.054) (0.048) (0.043) (0.055) (0.040) (0.065) (0.071) (0.043) 
IMRt-1 -0.014* -0.017** -0.011* -0.012** -0.018* -0.015** -0.011* -0.019* 
 
(0.106) (0.043) (0.078) (0.046) (0.075) (0.041) (0.082) (0.070) 
IRBt-1 -.108** -.111* -.117** -.105* -0.107** -.102** -.114* -.107** 
 
(0.042) (0.077) (0.043) (0.084) (0.050) (0.045) (0.071) (0.043) 
ROAEt-1 -0.046* -0.032 -0.044* -0.041 -0.038* -0.041* -0.038* -0.041* 
 
(0.068) (0.109) (0.074) (0.126) (0.080) (0.068) (0.071) (0.066) 
C_It-1 0.288* 0.284* 0.291* 0.296** 0.291** - 0.288** - 
 
(0.063) (0.068) (0.057) (0.043) (0.040) 
 
(0.041) 
 
E_TAt-1 0.218* 0.217** 0.219* 0.222** 0.211* 0.220* 0.223* 0.218* 
 
(0.079) (0.046) (0.056) (0.044) (0.073) (0.068) (0.078) (0.067) 
GLGRt-1 - 0.066* 0.068* - 0.061 0.060 - 0.069* 
  
(0.073) (0.071) 
 
(0.108) (0.113) 
 
(0.067) 
LP t-1 - - - 0.126* 0.128* - - - 
    
(0.068) (0.062) 
   
GL_TA t-1 0.047* 0.042* 0.046* 0.038 0.041* - 0.043* - 
 
(0.068) (0.072) (0.057) (0.101) (0.063) 
 
(0.072) 
 
II_GRt-1 - - - - - 0.071* - 0.075* 
      
(0.068) 
 
(0.075) 
GDPt-1 -0.324* -0.389* -0.337** -0.342** -0.334* -0.324* -0.385* -0.333** 
 
(0.061) (0.065) (0.042) (0.046) (0.069) (0.067) (0.051) (0.045) 
UNt-1 0.127* 0.129* 0.125* 0.116* 0.118* 0.123* 0.114* 0.115 
 
(0.078) (0.073) (0.075) (0.065) (0.064) (0.068) (0.075) (0.112) 
HPIt-1 -0.047 -0.048* -0.045 -0.043 -0.045* -0.046* -0.041 -0.046* 
 
(0.104) (0.091) (0.103) (0.102) (0.097) (0.068) (0.103) (0.063) 
DRECt - - - 
0.005 
- - - 
0.004 
(0.128) (0.121) 
County 
Yes 
 
Yes Yes 
 
Yes 
 
Yes 
Dummies  
N. Obs. 672 
       
Hansen Test 0.532 0.527 0.533 0.511 0.521 0.524 0.526 0.518 
Sargan Test             0.327 0.343 0.314 0.324 0.336 0.329 0.318 0.314 
AR(1) 0.251 0.233 0.247 0.241 0.256 0.219 0.269 0.234 
AR(2) 0.213 0.229 0.225 0.217 0.213 0.227 0.215 0.211 
Wald chi-sq 
test        
1202 1201 1224 1326 1276 1297 1233 1211 
 
Panel A reports results of the System GMM estimates on a subsample of more conservative banks. More conservative 
banks are defined as banks that, over the 2008-2013 period, show an average value of the growth of gross loans below the 
median of the growth of gross loans of the total sample. 
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Panel B reports results of the System GMM estimates on a subsample of less conservative banks. Less conservative banks 
are defined as banks that, over the 2008-2013 period, show an average value of the growth of gross loans above the median 
of the growth of gross loans of the total sample. 
The dependent variable is the ratio of non-performing loans on gross loans as measure of bank’s asset quality (NPL/GL). 
The IMR is the Inverse Mills ratio at time t-1. Explanatory variables are: the instrumenting variable NPL_GL at time t-1; 
the dummy variable IRB at time t-1 that equals 1 if bank adopts the internal rating based approach; the return on average 
equity ratio at time t-1 (ROAE) and the cost to income ratio at time t-1 (C_I); the equity over total assets at time t-1 
(E_TA), the growth rate of gross loans at time t-1 (GLGR); the loan premium at time t-1 (LP) calculated as the difference 
between the bank average interest rate applied on bank loans (measured as the interest income on gross loans divided by 
the average of gross loans at time t-1 and t) and the interest rate  on 10-years Government Bond of the respective country; 
the gross loans over total assets ratio at time t-1 (GL_TA) and the interest income divided by gross revenues at time t-1 
(II_GR); the GDP growth rate at country level at time t-1, the unemployment rate at time t-1 (UN) and the house price 
index at time t-1 (HPI); a dummy variable for the recovery period that takes value 1 only in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (DREC) 
and country dummies. 
***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
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Table 10 
Determinants of NPL ratio for the subsample of ‘no-switching banks’ 
 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
NPL_GLt-1 0.281** 0.275** 0.291** 0.288*** 0.302*** 0.305** 0.311** 0.296*** 
 
(0.013) (0.047) (0.035) (0.009) (0.008) (0.032) (0.064) (0.000) 
IMRt-1 -0.020*** -0.018*** -0.024** -0.025*** -0.017** -0.026*** -0.018** -0.021*** 
 
(0.006) (0.000) (0.018) (0.000) (0.012) (0.000) (0.038) (0.000) 
IRBt-1 -.101*** -.103*** -.107** -.108** -0.103*** -.100** -.109*** -.111*** 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.014) (0.026) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) (0.000) 
ROAEt-1 -0.040* -0.042* -0.041* -0.042* -0.045* -0.041* -0.043* -0.046* 
 
(0.068) (0.066) (0.057) (0.068) (0.089) (0.075) (0.092) (0.061) 
C_It-1 0.321*** 0.323** 0.322*** 0.317** 0.318** - 0.319*** - 
 
(0.008) (0.027) (0.004) (0.021) (0.012) 
 
(0.006) 
 
E_TAt-1 0.218** 0.227** 0.232*** 0.236** 0.222** 0.219*** 0.224*** 0.228** 
 
(0.017) (0.032) (0.003) (0.015) (0.011) (0.006) (0.005) (0.046) 
GLGRt-1 - 0.068** 0.061** - 0.075** 0.070** - 0.068** 
  
(0.038) (0.029) 
 
(0.044) (0.042) 
 
(0.015) 
LP t-1 - - - 0.135** 0.133** - - - 
    
(0.033) (0.038) 
   
GL_TA t-1 0.038** 0.044** 0.041** 0.040** 0.040* - 0.042* - 
 
(0.045) (0.044) (0.047) (0.048) (0.052) 
 
(0.051) 
 
II_GRt-1 - - - - - 0.061** - 0.063** 
      
(0.041) 
 
(0.047) 
GDPt-1 -0.345*** -0.356*** -0.341** -0.352*** -0.339*** -0.335*** -0.364*** -0.351*** 
 
(0.001) (0.006) (0.012) (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.005) (0.000) 
UNt-1 0.135** 0.133*** 0.132*** 0.138** 0.137*** 0.131*** 0.137** 0.132** 
 
(0.015) (0.005) (0.006) (0.011) (0.005) (0.009) (0.016) (0.008) 
HPIt-1 -0.043** -0.048*** -0.051* -0.053** -0.050** -0.049* -0.052** -0.047* 
 
(0.022) (0.009) (0.052) (0.046) (0.011) (0.058) (0.048) (0.067) 
DRECt - - - 
0.005 
- - - 
0.008* 
(0.116) (0.085) 
County 
Yes - Yes Yes - Yes 
 
Yes 
Dummies  
N. Obs. 1078 
       
Hansen 
Test 
0.665 0.643 0.672 0.649 0.658 0.663 0.691 0.666 
Sargan 
Test             
0.318 0.289 0.311 0.322 0.328 0.307 0.316 0.322 
AR(1) 0.211 0.228 0.229 0.259 0.202 0.218 0.211 0.233 
AR(2) 0.623 0.639 0.611 0.628 0.615 0.607 0.615 0.622 
Wald chi-
sq test        
1342 1348 1356 1349 1355 1358 1362 1331 
Table reports results of the System GMM estimates on a subsample of banks that do not change their credit risk 
measurement approach during the period observed (154 banks). 
The dependent variable is the ratio of non-performing loans on gross loans as measure of bank’s asset quality (NPL/GL). 
The IMR is the Inverse Mills ratio at time t-1. Explanatory variables are: the instrumenting variable NPL_GL at time t-1; 
the dummy variable IRB at time t-1 that equals 1 if bank adopts the internal rating based approach; the return on average 
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equity ratio at time t-1 (ROAE) and the cost to income ratio at time t-1 (C_I); the equity over total assets at time t-1 
(E_TA) , the growth rate of gross loans at time t-1 (GLGR); the loan premium at time t-1 (LP) calculated as the difference 
between the bank average interest rate applied on bank loans (measured as the interest income on gross loans divided by 
the average of gross loans at time t-1 and t) and the interest rate  on 10-years Government Bond of the respective country; 
the gross loans over total assets ratio at time t-1 (GL_TA) and the interest income divided by gross revenues at time t-1 
(II_GR); the GDP growth rate at country level at time t-1, the unemployment rate at time t-1 (UN) and the house price 
index at time t-1 (HPI); a dummy variable for the recovery period that takes value 1 only in 2013, 2014 and 2015 (DREC) 
and country dummies. 
***, ** and * indicate that coefficients are statistically significant at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.  
 
 
